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Sir Isaac Newton’s third law of motion—to every action, there is an 
equal and opposite reaction—has been used for centuries to explain the relation-
ship between an object’s movement in space and its effect on its surroundings.1 
Newton’s third law also could explain the relationship between the executive 
branch’s assertion of prosecutorial authority and the Supreme Court’s emerging 
over-criminalization doctrine of statutory interpretation.   
Consider Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ new Department of Justice 
policy on charging as a force. The Sessions Memo directs federal prosecutors to 
charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense, except in the 
exceptional case.2  
Sessions’ policy is notable, considering the growing bipartisan consen-
sus that the federal criminal code has grown unreasonably in recent years, both 
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1 See generally Sir Isaac Newton, Axioms or Laws of Motion, in THE MATHEMATICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrew Motte trans., 1729).  
2 Memorandum from Attorney General Jeff Sessions to All Federal Prosecutors (Sessions Memo) 
(May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download. 
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in the number of laws that impose criminal penalties and in the reach of a stat-
ute.3 Sessions, however, seeks to “fully utilize[] the tools Congress has given.”4   
Indeed, while Sessions authorizes prosecutors to deviate from the most 
serious offense policy if a prosecutor exercises “good judgment,”5 he fails to 
provide any guidance on what “good judgment” entails. Moreover, Sessions 
requires prosecutors to seek approval and document the file whenever they fail 
to charge the most serious, readily provable offense.6 An ordinary prosecutor 
would read Sessions’ words as discouraging leniency. And, in many cases, far 
from exercising discretion, prosecutors will use the Sessions Memo as justifi-
cation to over-charge offenses.   
If the Sessions policy encouraging overcharging is an action, then 
recent history tells us that accelerated development of the Supreme Court’s 
doctrine of statutory interpretation based on principles of over-crimin-
alization and abuse of prosecutorial discretion is the likely reaction. Indeed, 
although the Court has traditionally understood prosecutorial discretion to be 
outside of judicial scrutiny,7 in recent years the Court has decided a string of 
recent cases limiting the statute’s scope—Bond,8 Yates,9 McDonnell,10 and 
Maslenjak,11—where the driving force underscoring the Court’s decision 
centered on an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Examining each case shows 
how the Court has used statutory interpretation as a reaction to the action of 
prosecutorial overreach. 
In Bond v. United States, a jilted wife attempted to injure her husband’s 
lover by placing household chemicals on a doorknob, a mailbox, and the 
woman’s car door, hoping that her husband’s lover would be poisoned.12 Pros-
ecutors charged Bond under the mail fraud statute, and also charged her with 
violating provisions under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation 
																																								 																				
3 See generally Criminal Justice Reform Initiative, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE, https://judiciary.house.gov/issue/criminal-justice-reform-initiative/ (providing 
areas of reform, including sentencing reform, over-criminalization, prison reform, civil asset 
forfeiture reform, and improved criminal procedures). 
4 Sessions Memo, supra note 2. 
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 The Court has concluded that “[t]his broad discretion . . . is particularly ill-suited to judicial 
review,” and that the factors that a court would consider to review such a prosecutorial 
decision “are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to 
undertake.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
8 Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014). 
9 Yates v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1074 (2015). 
10 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
11 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017). 
12 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085-86. 
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Act.13 In a unanimous 9-0 decision, the Court reversed Bond’s conviction under 
the Implementation Act.14 The Court found it “surprising” that the government 
would charge Bond with using a chemical weapon, reflecting a concern of 
prosecutorial abuse.15 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
“Prosecutorial discretion involves carefully weighing the benefits of a prose-
cution against the evidence needed to convict, the resources of the public fisc, 
and the public policy of the State.”16 
The Court’s decision in Bond also represents the first time the Court 
has expressed that, “[i]n settling on a fair reading of a statute, it is not unusual 
to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined term, particularly when there is 
dissonance between that ordinary meaning and the reach of the definition.”17 
This dissonant analysis was the bedrock of the Court’s opinion, which held that 
the Implementation Act’s phrase “chemical weapon” did not include Bond’s 
use of household chemicals to injure her husband’s lover.18   
One term after Bond, the Court addressed another quirky prosecution in 
Yates v. United States.19 Yates, a commercial fisherman, was accused of catch-
ing, and then disposing of, three undersized red grouper in the Gulf of Mexico.20 
Prosecutors charged Yates with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1519, commonly known 
as the “anti-shredding provision” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was enacted 
in the wake of the Enron document shredding scandal.21   
The question in Yates was whether an undersized fish fell within the 
meaning of the phrase “tangible object” in § 1519.22 In a 5-4 plurality decision, 
the Court determined that a fish is not a tangible object.23  
Despite the divided result, the Justices seemed to agree about the issues 
of over-criminalization and prosecutorial abuse.  At the Yates oral argument, 
Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern that federal prosecutors would enjoy 
“extraordinary leverage” should the Court give “tangible object” its “broadest 
interpretation.”24 Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer echoed similar concerns, 
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15 Id. at 2085. 
16 Id. at 2093. 
17 Id. at 2091. 
18 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090-94. 
19 Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074. 
20 Id. at 1078. 
21 Id. at 1081. 
22 Id. at 1081. 
23 Id. at 1081. 
24 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Yates v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7541). 
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while Justice Alito noted that the government’s expansive reading of the phrase 
would allow the statute to be applied in many trivial matters.25 
The late Justice Scalia took issue directly with the charging decision, 
despairingly asking the government if that “mad” prosecutor was “the same guy 
that brought the prosecution in Bond?”26  In frustration, he asked, “who do you 
have out there that exercises prosecutorial discretion?”27 And, perhaps 
prophetically, he noted that if the government continued to bring cases like Yates, 
“we’re going to have to be much more careful about how extensive statutes 
are.”28 Even Justice Kagan in her dissent acknowledged that “§ 1519 is a bad 
law—too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which 
give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion[,]” and 
“is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the 
federal criminal code.”29 
A year after Yates, the Court, in McDonnell v. United States, reversed 
the conviction of former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell for performing 
an “official act” under the federal bribery statute30 in exchange for loans and 
gifts.31 This statute makes it a crime for “a public official or person selected to 
be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly” to demand, seek, receive, 
accept, or agree “to receive or accept anything of value” in return for being 
“influenced in the performance of any official act.”32   
The charges against Governor McDonnell related to his acceptance of 
$175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits from a constituent, Virginia busi-
nessman Jonnie Williams, who served as the chief executive officer of the 
Virginia-based nutritional supplement company Star Scientific.33 Star Scien-
tific hoped that Virginia’s public universities would perform research studies 
related to one of its products, and Williams wanted Governor McDonnell’s 
assistance in obtaining those studies.34  
In an 8-0 unanimous decision, the Court held that an “official act” is 
a decision or action on a “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or contro-
versy,” and that to qualify as an “official act,” the public official must decide 
																																								 																				
25 Id. at 50.  
26 Id. at 28. 
27 Id. at 27. 
28 Id. at 29.  
29 Yates, 135 S.Ct. at 1101. 
30 18 U.S.C. § 201. 
31 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361. 
32 Id. at 2365 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 201).    
33 Id. at 2364-67. 
34 Id.  
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or take an action on that question or matter, or agree to do so.35 The Court 
concluded that Governor McDonnell’s act of setting up a meeting, talking to 
other officials, and organizing an event did not amount to an “official act.”36 
Prosecutorial abuse was a core issue in the Court’s McDonnell analysis. 
The Court expressed concern that the government’s expansive interpretation 
of “official act” would make “nearly anything a public official accepts—from 
a campaign contribution to lunch—count as a quid; and nearly anything a 
public official does—from arranging a meeting to inviting a guest to an 
event—count as a quo.”37 But the “basic compact underlying representative 
government,” the Court wrote, “assumes that public officials will hear from 
their constituents and act appropriately on their concerns—whether it is the 
union official worried about a plant closing or the homeowners who wonder 
why it took five days to restore power to their neighborhood after a storm.”38  
The Court worried that the government’s position “could cast a pall of potential 
prosecution over these relationships if the union had given a campaign 
contribution in the past or the homeowners invited the official to join them on 
their annual outing to the ballgame.”39 
Maslenjak v. United States is the most recent example of prosecutorial 
abuse (force) resulting in the Court limiting the reach of a criminal statute 
(reaction).40 In 1998, Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb from modern-day Bosnia, 
was granted refugee status after he falsely told immigration officials he feared 
persecution in his home region in Bosnia during the Bosnian civil war due to 
his ethnicity, when he had been a member of the Serbian military unit.41 In 
2007, Maslenjak was convicted on two counts of making false statements for 
his failure to disclose that he had served as an officer in a Serbian military.42 
The government separately charged Maslenjak with two counts under 18 
U.S.C. § 1425(a)–which makes it a crime to “knowingly procure[]” natural-
ization “contrary to law,”–for denying having given false information to 
immigration officials.43  Because Maslenjak was convicted under federal law, 
the government was authorized to strip Maslenjak of his U.S. citizenship.44 
																																								 																				
35 Id. at 2367-68. 
36 Id.  
37 McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2372. 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918. 
41 Id. at 1923. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1922. 
44 Id. at 1923-24. 
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At issue in Maslenjak is whether § 1425(a)’s phrase “knowingly 
procure . . . contrary to law,” could apply to an immaterial false statement.45  
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Government claimed that 
any misstatement to an official during the naturalization process could cause 
an individual to have his or her citizenship revoked under § 1425, regardless 
of the statement’s materiality.46 The Government argued, “Congress has 
required that individuals who seek th[e] high privilege [of citizenship] must 
scrupulously comply with every rule governing the naturalization process.”47 
At oral argument, several Justices posited hypotheticals, highlighting 
the vast reach of § 1425.48 The government’s responses to those hypotheticals 
left the Court concerned about the government’s power under the statute.49  
Justice Breyer, for instance, told the Government that, “it’s, to me, rather 
surprising that the government of the United States thinks that Congress is 
interpreting this statute and wanted it interpreted in a way that would throw 
into doubt the citizenship of vast percentages of all naturalized citizens.”50  
He opined that the Government’s interpretation of §1425 “would raise a 
pretty serious constitutional question.”51 
Building upon Justice Breyer’s concern, Justice Roberts addressed the 
root of the problem as he saw it: abuse of prosecutorial discretion.52 Justice 
Roberts stated: 
 
I don’t think this is problem . . . of a constitutional statute, but it 
is certainly a problem of prosecutorial abuse.  
 
If you take the position that refusing to – not answering about the 
speeding ticket or the nickname is enough to subject that person 
to denaturalization, the government will have the opportunity to 
denaturalize anyone they want, because everybody is going to 
have a situation where they didn’t put in something like that – or 
at least most people. And then the government can decide, we 
are going to denaturalize you for other reasons than what might 
appear on your naturalization form, or we're not. And that to me 
																																								 																				
45 Id. at 1924. 
46 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-30, Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1918 (2017) 
(No. 16-309) (hereinafter cited as “Maslenjak Transcript”).  
47 Id. at 27. 
48 Id. at 27-28.  
49 Id. at 28. 
50 Id. at 32. 
51 Id. at 53. 
52 Maslenjak Transcript at 54. 
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is – is troublesome to give that extraordinary power, which, 
essentially, is unlimited power, at least in most cases, to the 
government.53 
 
The Justices once again returned to themes of over-criminalization and 
prosecutorial abuse. Chief Justice Roberts asked whether the naturalization 
form, which requires an applicant to list every crime he “committed, assisted 
in committing, or attempted to commit a crime or offense for which you were 
not arrested,” would require him to disclose that, “some time ago, outside the 
statute of limitations, I drove 60 miles an hour in a 55-mile-an-hour zone.”54 
He further asked, “if I answer that question no, 20 years after I was naturalized 
as a citizen, you can knock on my door and say, guess what, you’re not an 
American citizen after all?”55 
Counsel for the Government responded that “that is how the govern-
ment would interpret that, that it would require you to disclose those sorts of 
offenses.”56The Government’s response left Justice Roberts incredulous, caus-
ing him to reply: “Oh, come on!  You’re saying that on this form, you expect 
everyone to list every time in which they drove over the speed limit!?”57 
The Government’s failure to alleviate the Justices’ concern about pros-
ecutorial abuse was directly expressed in the Court’s majority opinion. The 
Court held that the most natural understanding of “knowingly procure . . . 
contrary to law,” is that the illegal act must have somehow contributed to the 
obtaining of citizenship.58 Indeed, in rejecting the Government’s argument, the 
Court explained that, “by so wholly unmooring the revocation of citizenship 
from its award, the Government opens the door to a world of disquieting conse-
quences—which . . . would give prosecutors nearly limitless leverage—and 
afford newly naturalized Americans precious little security.”59 By seeking the 
broadest interpretation of §1425(a), the Government effectively forced the Court 
to hold that the statute does not go as far as the Government claims.60 
Bond, Yates, McDonnell, and Maslenjak represent the kind of action–
reaction relationship that occurs when federal prosecutors abuse prosecutorial 
discretion. The message from the Court has been clear: If the Justice Depart-
ment uses the criminal code with unreasonable force by failing to exercise 
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55 Id. at 27-28. 
56 Id. at 28. 
57 Id. 
58 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1924. 
59 Id. at 1927. 
60 Id. at 1927-28. 
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sound discretion, the Court will respond to that force by using one of its most 
powerful tools, statutory interpretation, to narrow the scope and reach of the 
statutes in a prosecutor’s arsenal.   
Because Sessions’ policy endorses broad exercise of prosecutorial 
powers, his policy is likely to accelerate the Court’s development of its over-
criminalization doctrine of statutory interpretation. For instance, one can easily 
foresee this particular Justice Department aggressively use the criminal code 
to target journalists who report on information obtained from leaks, and for the 
Court to protect journalists from prosecutorial abuse.61 
Sessions, and indeed any federal prosecutor, should take a lesson from 
physics. If Sessions’ goal is for prosecutors to “fully utilize[] the tools Congress 
has given,”62 he may do well to heed the lessons from Bond on through 
Maslenjak and advise his prosecutors as to the meaning of “good judgment,” 
and provide prosecutors with reasonable guidance on when to deviate from the 
most serious readily provable offense policy. If Sessions fails to do so, the laws 
of judicial physics dictate that the Court will scale back the power of 
prosecutors—an intended result he surely wishes to avoid. 
 
																																								 																				
61 See, e.g., James P. Freeman, Will Trump Use the Espionage Act Against Journalists?, NEW 
BOSTON POST (Aug. 4, 2017), http://newbostonpost.com/2017/08/04/will-trump-use-the-
espionage-act-against-journalists/ (describing how Obama’s use of the Espionage Act 
opened the door for the current government to use the Espionage Act to prosecute journalists 
responsible for what President Trump defines as “fake news”). 
62 Sessions Memo, supra note 2. 
